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Paradox in the Pursuit of a Critical Theorization of 
the Development of Self in Family Relationships. 
Wendy Hollway 
Open University 
ABSTRACT. This article starts with my dissatisfaction with the post-
structuralist treatment of the production of subjectivity within regulatory 
discourses and practices due to its neglect of psychological processes. 
Taking starting points from within the history set out in the previous 
article, it highlights the paradox for critical psychologists like myself 
involved in both applying a post-structuralist critique to ‘psy’ discourses 
and trying to theorize subjectivity in a way that goes beyond the dualism 
of individual and society, of psychology and sociology. The relational, or 
intersubjective, approach to self that originates in object relations 
psychoanalysis as it emerged in the mid-20th-century UK is central to 
both of these activities; object of the former and resource for the latter. I 
explore the paradox that this creates for critical psychology, both 
epistemological and ontological. In aiming to provide a psycho-social 
account of self in family relationships, I deploy the radical 
conceptualisation of intersubjectivity initiated in British object relations 
theory as a way of going beyond both the individualized self and the 
neglect of psychological processes in constructionist theorizing 
subjectivity. 
KEY WORDS: intersubjectivity, object relations, psycho-social, self, 
subjectivity  
Introduction: The Paradox 
The historical and cultural study of diverse codes of the constitution of 
subjectivity, or the historical study of the formation of the individual, does 
not answer the question: what mechanisms and dynamics are involved in 
the developmental process through which the human infant, a vulnerable 
and dependent body, becomes a distinct self with the ability to speak its 
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language and the ability to participate in the complex social processes 
which define its world? (Benhabib, 1992, p. 217) 
Benhabib’s formulation is an incisive example of a criticism that has been 
levelled at recent post-structuralist and, more generally, constructionist 
theories of the constitution of subjectivity, namely that they neglect the 
internal psychological processes in self formation. However, it is these 
accounts that have tended to dominate European - and certainly British - 
critical psychology. Critical challenges to the individualized idea of self 
have been prominent in social theory and psychology for several decades, 
as recent debates in this journal have illustrated (Drewery, 2005;; 
Sampson, 2003; Shotter & Lannaman, 2002 see also McNamee & Gergen, 
1999). They have enabled a new, invigorated social psychology which 
takes a social constructionist stance to subjectivity and self (Gergen, 2001; 
Sampson, 1993a; Wetherell, 1998). My formation as a social psychologist, 
coupled with the ‘cultural turn’ in British social science, has been strongly 
infuenced by this critical history. It has caused me to lean heavily towards 
a discursive account of subjectivity, until, in danger of falling off 
completely (i.e. **totally abandoning psychological processes in my 
account of individual action ), I have been trying to correct my balance. In 
drawing strongly from the British object relations tradition in 
psychoanalysis, some would say that I am leaning too heavily in the other 
direction. Nonetheless, I now count myself among those, like Benhabib 
above, who regard the post-structuralist account as insufficiently 
cognizant of the psychological processes whereby the recursive formation 
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of selves within their life settings is not only mediated by complex 
material, discursive and relational influences but also by dynamic, 
intersubjective, unconscious processes. 
Social constructionist challenges involved several different 
emphases. The critical use of discourse analysis has ranged from the 
Foucauldian kind to what is usually known as discursive psychology, 
which takes as its focus discourse itself, rather than the speaker or writer 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987). This kind is now influential in qualitative 
social psychology. Recently, Drewery (2005) took up the challenge of 
explaining agency in this framework by emphasizing the performative 
character of talk (e.g. ‘persons** who are participants in the conversations 
that produce the meanings of their lives are in an agentic position’, p. 
315). Both discursive and developmental perspectives emphasize the 
central importance of relational dynamics in the constitution of selves, but 
discursive psychology finds no need for a concept of unconscious conflict, 
emphasizing instead how subjects are positioned, or take up positions, in 
dialogue with others. In this respect it is antithetical to psychoanalysis, its 
history being based on the radical rejection of an internal world; a 
rejection based on the critique of cognitive psychology and how it theorized 
attitudes (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
My discursive starting point in the companion article (Hollway, 
2006) was rather in the history of developmental accounts of self in family 
relations, using Foucauldian discourse analysis. Its contestation of 
psychoanalysis is based on a different emphasis, namely on its scepticism 
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about the truth claims of any expert discourse, which are viewed with 
automatic suspicion because of their implication in power-knowledge-
practice relations. The tendency of post-structuralist analysis is to see 
psychoanalytic discourse as complicit in the subjectification of persons 
through its discourses and practices, rather than being capable of 
generating valid knowledge about familial subjects. The object relations 
tradition on which I draw in this article has not been exempt from these 
critiques as they have been applied to family figures (e.g. Rose, 1990; 
Smart, Neale, & Wade, 2001). 
Power-knowledge-practice relations are easily discerned in the 
material of the companion article, as I demonstrated: for example, in the 
way that the developmental technology of measured milestones of normal 
development contributed to a tyranny of the normal and the authority of 
the label ‘abnormal’. Yes, expert discourses and practices shape 
subjectivity in the way that writers like Nikolas Rose meticulously argue. 
The lack that is crucial in my dissatisfaction with both these types of 
constructionist challenge to psychology is that neither adopts a 
developmental account of subjectivity. In contrast, I want to ask, taking 
Benhabib’s conclusion as my starting point, how subjectivity (or ‘self’) is 
formed within primary relations, and for this I draw on the tradition of 
object relations psychoanalysis, even while** critiquing certain 
individualized notions of the self. 
In the companion article, I demonstrated the considerable variation 
in theorizing the development of subjectivity between discourses, notably 
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between psychology and psychoanalysis, and between attachment and 
object relations discourses within psychoanalysis. I demonstrated that 
these variations were a product of uneven changes in epistemology, 
methodology, professional location and form of intervention. By pointing to 
these uneven developments, I wanted to mitigate a potentially rather 
monolithic analysis of subjectification by showing the dynamic and diverse 
character of ‘psy’ discourses. I also found some to be better than others. 
This claim raises the epistemological question of the reality against which 
their validity is evaluated. Without this, the idea that I can both retain a 
post-structuralist perspective on developmental psychoanalysis and use a 
version of it to theorize subjectivity would be untenable. 
So I intend to bear this in mind as I draw on the accounts of self 
development in 20th-century British object relations theory in order to 
extract principles which, in my view, are better - sound and useful - for 
understanding subjectivity psycho-socially. They are ‘sound’ because they 
are inserted in a history of openness to complex, socially based evidence, 
informed by sophisticated ontology and epistemology, and ‘useful’ because 
they have been tested and theoretically refined through professional 
practice. (See next section for elaboration.) 
Psycho-social is a term that has recently re-emerged in two 
disparate social science discourses with contested meanings. In the largely 
positivist tradition of health sciences, for example, it is often found 
hyphenated, along with biology (‘bio-psycho-social’), to refer to the additive 
treatment of different levels of analysis in the same research framework. 
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The treatment is invariably atheoretical. In contrast, my usage here and 
elsewhere (see also Frosh, 2003; Hollway & Jefferson 2005; Jefferson, 
2003) derives from a commitment to understand subjectivity and agency 
in a way that transcends individual-social dualism and draws on 
psychoanalysis for this purpose. In this perspective, we are psycho-social 
because we are products of a unique life history of anxiety- and desire-
provoking life events and the manner in which they have been 
transformed in internal reality. We are psycho-social because such 
defensive activities affect and are affected by material conditions and 
discourses (systems of meaning which pre-exist any given individual), 
because unconscious defences are intersubjective processes (i.e. they affect 
and are affected by others with whom we are in communication), and 
because of the real events in the external, social world which are 
discursively, desirously and defensively appropriated. For me the hyphen 
should be retained if it signifies the principle that wherever you find the 
social, you find psychic processes in the making of it (and, of course, vice 
versa) (Hollway, 2004, p. 7). This approach to subjectivity requires, in my 
view, a life-historical, developmental account of selves, albeit formed in 
the process of their practical engagement with the social, material and 
discursive worlds. It is this that various constructionist critiques have 
rejected. 
It is probably relevant at this point to say that the above critique 
closely mirrors my own intellectual trajectory. Disillusioned with the 
individualism of 20th-century positivist psychology, I looked to sociology 
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and eventually concluded that too often it mirrored psychology’s own blind 
spots. A psycho-social approach to subjectivity is my attempt to transcend 
that dualism. Until recently, psychoanalysis has been hard to come by in 
British academic culture, and it is only because it offered an endless 
supply of insights into subjectivity (my own included) that I, and others, 
have pursued it, through its many varieties and along with its many 
critics. Feminism provided the permission to bring one’s own experience 
into academic work. It has probably been my experience of motherhood 
that has contributed most to the position represented here, challenging my 
earlier idea of relationality and insisting on a developmental turn in my 
psycho-social theorization of subjectivity. 
My question here, namely how self is formed in primary (family) 
relationships, is similar to the question that developmental 
psychoanalysts such as Winnicott were posing. This ontological question is 
the primary focus of this article. However, it is preceded by an 
epistemological one, since critical psychology has taught me to situate 
claims to knowledge within a nexus of power-knowledge-practice relations, 
as I did in the companion article. Herein lies the paradox referred to in the 
title of this article. How can the ‘psy’ disciplines claim to know anything 
about subjectivity if their knowledges are uniformly compromised by being 
a product of power relations (however multiple, productive and 
microscopic) that produce Truth (in Foucault’s terminology) but refuse the 
possibility of, even the question of, specific, located truths (in critical 
realist terminology)? 
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Psychology’s and psychoanalysis’s epistemology have both been 
realist, in the sense that they assume that there are better and worse 
ways of understanding people and that there are criteria according to 
which one can judge the validity of knowledge. Twentieth-century 
psychology’s belief in the accessibility of truth, via a scientific method, is 
now widely regarded as naive and has been modified, for many, by the 
idea that all reality is multiply socially mediated. (As I shall argue, it 
would be more satisfactory if these multiple mediations included intra-
psychic and intersubjective, as well as discursive, mediations.) The same 
critique has left the idea of scientific objectivity lacking in credibility in 
psychology. What is harder to establish is how psychology proceeds to 
evaluate its knowledge claims given these critiques. It can either give up 
on the idea of evaluating truth claims altogether (even when reality is 
acknowledged in principle, as it often must be, but not included in the 
analysis) and take the position that they are all ‘Truths’, or it can find a 
way of evaluating truth claims in a reality that is multiply mediated. The 
latter is a critical realist position. 
My epistemological question draws me back into what I regard as 
the paradox of critical psychology: to conduct this epistemological exercise 
I need to posit some theoretical principles concerning human subjectivity, 
specifically about the way people know and avoid knowing things about 
their surrounding reality. I draw on object relations psychoanalysis for 
this purpose. Yet, in using these I lay myself open to the post-structuralist 
argument that psychoanalytic knowledge is a product of (oppressive) 
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power-knowledge-practice relations and is therefore compromised. Does 
this mean that I should not be basing any claims upon it? 
Hospitalized children 
In order to pursue the epistemological question, I shall take one of the 
historical examples described briefly in the companion article: the care of 
hospitalized children. I have chosen this because I am persuaded that the 
knowledge produced was better than what preceded it, and this requires 
that I explicate my criteria and epistemological justification for concluding 
this. A claim about better or worse knowledge does not entail an 
assumption of progress in knowledge generally, of the kind that has often 
underpinned positivist approaches to science. The claim is restricted to 
these cases. In other cases, new knowledges can entail new blindnesses, 
for example when the idea of women’s needs (progressive in other 
respects) entails a denial that children’s needs do or should impact on 
mothers and women primary carers (as well as fathers). 
It is tautologous to point out that a new power-knowledge-practice 
nexus emerged in the course of changing the regime for hospitalized 
children to enable the continuation of their primary attachments and 
facilitate surrogate attachments with hospital workers. The fruitful 
question is how did this happen? In particular, for my present, 
epistemological, purposes, what contribution did evidence (of children 
suffering separation) make in this change and in what sense was this 
valid? One feature of the answer involves correcting what I see as a social 
(or social power) deterministic tendency in post-structuralist and discourse 
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theory, by using a psycho-social approach to production and change in 
knowledge in the ‘psy’ disciplines. 
In the post-war British context, James Robertson and his wife Joyce 
pursued a successful campaign to enable parents to have more contact 
with their hospitalized children and to change the nursing regime in 
children’s wards. The pre-war treatment of children in hospital can 
usefully be understood as an expression of power-knowledge-practice 
relations where the object of knowledge was construed as the individual 
child with physical needs that could be addressed in the medical 
environment of a hospital ward. This produced a Truth (using Foucault’s 
capital) that in its turn guided practice and reinforced certain blindnesses; 
in this case the blindness to the young child’s emotional suffering 
precipitated by the loss of his or her primary relationships. However, the 
discourse that constructed the physically ill, ‘settled’, individual child 
should not be taken as entirely shaping the behaviour of the children or 
positioning them wholly successfully within its confines. Their treatment 
was, in Foucault’s terms, an instance of ‘subjectification’; in other words 
they were subject to a regime that had definite effects on their 
subjectivity. At the same time, their behaviour, both during and after 
hospitalisation, remained a mute testimony to what was not malleable in 
their psychological make-up. It provided evidence of the wrongness of 
their treatment, and it was attention to this behaviour and its later 
dissemination through the powerful medium of film that helped to change 
paediatric practices in Britain. 
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James Robertson was indeed** a purveyor of a new discourse, the 
attachment discourse, whose emergence and trajectory I documented in 
the companion article. He was** conducting the fieldwork for Bowlby on a 
project ‘to observe and describe the behaviour of young children during 
and after separation from the mother’ (Robertson & Robertson, 1989, p. 
10). From a constructionist position, we can say that this new knowledge, 
inserted into a nexus of power-knowledge-practice relations, produced a 
new truth of the child subject, psychological rather than physical; an 
emotional, relational one, emphasizing a child suffering a loss of 
attachment. This is convincing as far as it goes. It is probable that without 
the emergence of this new discourse, the Robertsons would not have seen 
what they did see in the behaviour of young hospitalized children. 
Where doctors and nurses typically construed a happy ward as a 
quiet one where children had ‘settled’ after a period of temporary upset 
after admission, Robertson saw evidence of the phases through which 
children were said to move, following an attachment discourse, in response 
to separation from an attachment figure: ‘those who had been in hospital 
for some months had moved from Protest and Despair into the third phase 
which I called Denial/Detachment (denying the wish for relationships)’ 
(Robertson & Robertson, 1989, p. 15). The mental health consequences of a 
long period in this phase for long-stay especially very young children were 
very serious, in Robertson’s view. He sought and found evidence for this 
through long-term follow-up of children who returned home after 
hospitalisation. 
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I am claiming that the behaviour of these children - the material of 
human subjectivity as expressed in that particular time and place - was 
better described by Robertson than by the preceding discourse, and that 
valid evidence was adduced to demonstrate this. If this sounds like 
positivist language, it is because I want to reclaim key aspects of realism, 
in the light of a post-structuralist critique. Of course the evidence was 
mediated by the new discourse, but my argument is that this does not 
make the reality inaccessible to an evaluation of its validity. (Likewise the 
fact of my own location within a multiplicity of discourses that differ from 
those available in 1950s Britain requires acknowledgement and analysis 
but does not constitute grounds for giving up the possibility of evaluating 
the validity of knowledge.) 
The new discourse made huge gains on the old in terms of 
understanding the children’s suffering and the effect of hospitalisation on 
their future problems. It also had its own blind spots, which in the 
companion article I have mentioned more broadly in relation to 
Bowlbyism. For example, in the Robertsons’ case study materials 
(Robertson & Robertson, 1989), fathers were clearly often involved and 
perturbed on their children’s behalf, as well as mothers. In this sense, 
where a new discourse can be claimed as more valid than an old one (or 
vice versa), this is not tantamount to claiming that research has arrived at 
the truth of the phenomenon under study. The key position of the mother-
child dyad in the discourse forced into the background an understanding 
of the effect on the child of loss of the other relationships and daily activity 
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that constituted home and family, including in particular those with 
father and siblings. All these were lost when a child was hospitalized. One 
of the virtues of detailed case studies is that these elements can be 
retrieved from the data (as in the example of the Cambridge evacuees’ 
data and Mitchell’s later discovery of the importance of siblings for 
children’s adjustment, see Hollway, 2006a), even if they are lost from the 
generalisations that are more firmly entrenched in the discourse. 
Because I argue that there is evidence (‘unruly’ evidence) in the 
children’s behaviour of elements of subjectivity that were not wholly 
confined within the dominant pre-war discourse, I need to ask why the 
doctors and nurses of the period were blind to it. A discursive answer is 
that they saw through the lens of a discourse of the individual ‘settled’ 
child. This is likely to be refined by pointing to the institutional practices 
that supported the discourse, for example a system of job allocation that 
meant that nurses were not allocated to particular children. Robertson 
identifies both discursive and institutional factors but he goes further and 
provides what I would call a psycho-social explanation: 
They [doctors and nurses] had inherited a system of 
care that was geared to ensuring that the system 
functioned smoothly with the focus of attention on 
physical illness, and were defended against 
recognizing the distress and danger for mental health 
caused. … The fact that under-fives cried on being 
visited was noted as ‘trouble’, not as a danger sign. 
(Robertson & Robertson, 1989, p. 9) 
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What Robertson adds to a social explanation is the idea of doctors’ and 
nurses’ defences against distress and trouble. In other words, the pre-war 
nexus of power-knowledge-practice was not only socially but also 
psychologically mediated. Menzies’ (1960) work on social defences against 
anxiety among nurses in hospital established this idea more widely and in 
detail. 
As well as going into children’s wards with a different discourse, 
Robertson was able to identify with the children he met there, despite the 
distress this caused him. He used an emotional mode of knowing that 
chimed with the theoretical discourse of attachment and loss he had 
espoused. This also influenced his choice of method. He filmed children 
over time in hospital because it came closest to what he called the 
‘actuality’. In its proximity to the children’s emotions it facilitated 
channels of identification that were crucial in enabling viewers to see 
distress where before they had seen trouble, a necessary precedent to 
changes in practice. In Robertson’s words: ‘when told by the visual 
medium the story was powerful; it [the film John] pierced defences and 
caused much disturbance in viewers. The reactions of a few colleagues 
convinced us we had a bomb on our hands’ (Robertson & Robertson, 1989, 
p. 89). 
In the companion article, I pointed to methodology and the 
intervention setting as factors in the production and change of ‘psy’ 
discourses; factors which also influenced the divergence of various ‘psy’ 
discourses because methods not only produce different knowledges but are 
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more or less open to unruly evidence. Attachment theory mediated the 
evidence because it influenced what they noticed and then how the 
Robertsons filmed and edited it, but it did not create the children’s 
distress, which was real and equally outside the control of the dominant 
paradigm and the attachment paradigm. A psycho-social account of how 
such evidence is or is not accessible to research requires taking account of 
psychological mediations (intrapsychic, such as denial and splitting, and 
intersubjective, such as projective identification, for example) as well as 
discursive mediations and the effects of institutional arrangements. 
The take-up of this new discourse and its effect on paediatric 
practices depended on the modification of defences against anxiety in 
researchers and practitioners. According to psychoanalysis, this is 
achieved most effectively by symbolization, in other words by articulating 
experiences in language or discourse. Along with the availability of this 
new discourse, the resultant potential for identification was a further 
important factor that enabled first one researcher and then paediatric 
professionals to reinterpret the evidence. This evidence of children’s 
distress exceeded the confines of the discourse and practices within which 
it had been packaged to avoid trouble. Thus the success of the Robertsons’ 
intervention involved methods whose strength was in communicating the 
evidence in ways that influenced the defences, not just the discourses, of 
practitioners; in other words, it involved psychological as well as social 
processes, or, better still, so as to defy the binary: it involved psycho-social 
processes. 
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By taking one example of institutional change - one that 
reverberated through the next decade and influenced the findings of the 
Platt report on nursing education in 1965 - I have tried to demonstrate 
how a psychodynamic account of change can supplement the dominantly 
social account that is characteristic of post-structuralist Foucauldian 
discourse analysis. In summary, the Robertsons’ research and intervention 
helped to produce a new discourse of child subjectivity but in so doing did 
not produce a new child subjectivity. 
Intersubjectivity 
Having argued for a critical realist approach to epistemology, I can now 
proceed to address ontology, in order to ask on what kind of subjectivity do 
power-knowledge-practice regimes impose themselves. Intersubjectivity is 
an ontological concept that has gained prominence in three traditions of 
psychological theorizing: phenomenology, developmental psychology and 
psychoanalysis. I described the approach of the second two in the 
companion article. (Phenomenology differs from psychoanalysis principally 
in its emphasis on conscious experience, in contrast to psychoanalysis’s 
emphasis on a dynamic unconscious** which is central to the account I 
develop here.) I include in intersubjectivity the unconscious flowing of 
mental states between one person and another that constantly modifies 
them. In the companion article, I showed that in the UK the 20th century 
saw a significant shift from discourses defining the individual child to 
relational discourses, and the relationship between child and mother/carer 
was the key paradigm. However, the ways in which this can be theorized 
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with regard to self development are varied and, as I showed, there were 
differences between Bowlby’s and Winnicott’s approaches. For these 
purposes, I am interested in the way that Winnicott’s account of the 
mother&ndash;infant relationship provided a radical means of going 
beyond the idea of two bounded individuals who interact. As I shall argue, 
his work and the wider tradition of British object relations in which it is 
situated enable a conceptualization of intersubjectivity that preserves both 
the individuality and the intersubjectivity of selves. Conflicts and dynamic 
tension between these remains a defining feature of adult subjectivity too. 
The Kleinian idea of subjectivity was succinctly summed up by Joan 
Riviere**(1959): ‘we are members one of another’ (p. 359). To capture this 
idea I refer to intersubjectivity, as opposed to relationality, because it 
unsettles the assumption of two (or more) distinct individuals who can 
then conduct a relationship and introduces the idea of a person whose 
internal world is made up of parts of all the people who have affected him 
or her. Money-Kyrle put it well when he said ‘there is a continual 
unconscious wandering of other personalities into ourselves. … Every 
person, then, is many persons; a multitude made into one’ (quoted in 
Brown, 1966, pp. 146&ndash;147). It is worth noting that this view is 
complemented by William James’s philosophical and more social view of 
the self at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. He regarded people as 
having multiple selves: ‘a man has as many social selves as there are 
individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind’ 
(James, 1890/1981, cited in Danziger, 1997, p. 148). 
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The fortunes of Winnicott’s intersubjective account of self 
development have been mixed in the intervening decades. From being 
embedded within health and social care practices in the 1950s and 1960s, 
developmental psychoanalytic perspectives lost ground with a shift in 
British social sciences from a focus on the individual to social conditions. 
Feminism, arriving on the scene in the 1970s, largely shared these 
sociological preferences. However, when sociological theories of social 
change seemed to have failed to transform gender relations, 
psychoanalysis experienced a renewal. More broadly it was used in 
reconceptualizing subjectivity following the critique of a Kantian, 
Enlightenment individual based on assumptions of autonomy, rationality 
and intentionality. The psychoanalytic tenet that action was governed as 
much by unconscious dynamics as by conscious intention decentred the 
rational unitary subject (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn, & 
Walkerdine, 1984). The huge influence in British academic feminism of 
Chodorow’s The Reproduction of Mothering (1978) demonstrated a central 
concern with the impact of mothering on the production of her children’s 
gendered subjectivity. From then on the relational nature of subjectivity 
was firmly on the feminist and critical psychology agenda in the UK. 
Psychoanalysis’s key shift from a drive-based to a relational 
paradigm (‘object relations theory’ in the British case, which is what I am 
largely drawing on) is usually attributed to Melanie Klein. For her the 
significant unconscious dynamics, those that were formative of the psyche, 
were intersubjective: that is, they operated between people. The early 
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psychological state of the infant is, according to Klein (1952/1988), the 
result of splitting, where bad and good experiences are split off from each 
other. One of the split elements - the bad, for example - can then be 
projected, can in fantasy be located in another person, in order to protect 
the self from such threatening experiences. 
At a time before the infant can experience any self boundaries, 
these are provided by the mother: ‘until the child has collected memory 
material, there is no room for the mother’s disappearance’ (Winnicott, 
1949/1975, p. 267). Bion (1967) saw this in terms of the container (mother) 
and contained (infant). Projective identification for him is a form of 
unconscious communication which enables the receptive mother to 
experience the feelings of her baby, transform them by using her mind, 
and through her body and emotional state communicate these modified, 
hopefully detoxified, feelings back to the infant, who can feel them to be 
bearable. The infant in this way borrows the mother’s mind, which only 
gradually becomes internalized to the point where it is the baby’s own 
resource. These are some of the developmental principles of object 
relations theory, and they have implications for adult subjectivity too. 
Object relations theory takes as its central premise the idea of an 
internal world. In object relations theory, the internal world is ‘a world of 
phantasy, made up of the self and other internal objects - persons, things, 
ideas and values that matter to us’ (Fakhry Davids, 2002, p. 67). This 
world of inner phantasy relationships ‘provides a template for our 
interactions with the outside world [and] is itself shaped by these’ (p. 67). 
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In this world real external objects are blended with projections, which is ‘a 
momentous psychic achievement as it allows aspects of mental life 
unacceptable to the self to exist in objects that are contained within the 
mind’ (p. 67). It also ensures creativity and enables agentic subjectivity to 
be accounted for in a way that is not dependent on an assumption of 
rational, intentional, unitary subjectivity (Hollway & Jefferson, 2005). 
What these accounts of intersubjectivity have in common is a notion 
of a dynamic unconscious: ‘the way in which our mind transforms new 
relations into old ones (transference); others into parts of ourselves 
(introjection); and parts of ourselves into others (projection)’ (Alford, 2002, 
p. 3), and it is this that distinguishes them from relational theories which 
revert to an idea of relationship between conscious, intentional bounded 
individuals (see Hollway in press, ch. 2) 
The idea of an internal world has been rejected by the vast majority 
of social scientists following the discursive turn, a turn premised on the 
disavowal of anything irreducibly psychic about subjectivity. The new 
sociology of childhood, which emerged in the UK close to the end of the 
20th century, is a case in point. Its hostility to the idea of an internal 
world combined with two other features. The first was a political 
commitment to children’s rights. The second was a rejection of the idea of 
development. Although based on a legitimate critique of developmentalism 
(i.e. of viewing development as fixed, staged and normative), this was 
over-generalized to reject the idea that some things do happen before 
others in child development (see Hollway, 2006, for the discussion of a 
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move from stage to phase). What emerges in the new sociology of 
childhood is an idea of an autonomous, rational subject which is applied as 
uncritically to children as it has been to adults (Christensen & James, 
2000;  Smart, Neale, & Wade, 2001). It is as if, as part of the politics of 
treating children more like adults,  recent sociology of childhood has 
forgotten the politics of critiquing the Enlightenment adult subject. 
Nonetheless, the new sociology of childhood made it possible to hear 
the stories children have to tell, for example about their families after 
divorce (Smart et al., 2001), in which they could position themselves as 
responsible agents in their families. Smart et al. contrast this with the 
‘psychologization** of childhood’ (p. 24), referring dismissively to the 
developments that I have referred to as the growth of the relational 
mother-child paradigm. They hold the paradigm responsible for what they 
call ‘harmism’, the tendency to see only harm in the breaking up of 
families (p. 37). 
As in this example, there is a danger of emphasizing unconscious 
intersubjectivity in the constitution of subjectivity at the expense of 
understanding the achievement of individuation and autonomy. 
Psychoanalysis makes the distinction between secondary process, the 
conscious, more intentional level of thought guiding action, where people’s 
experience is of a distinct and bounded self and others, and primary 
process, characterized by unconscious intersubjectivity, which is 
experientially prior and never thoroughly superseded by consciousness, 
continuing to exert a defining influence on subjectivity, actions and 
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relations. Winnicott, and psychoanalysis more generally, sees separation 
and the ability to differentiate between one’s own wishes and those 
emanating from outside as being crucial in the gradual achievement of 
self. Babies struggle to achieve unit status, and total independence is not 
the outcome of development. Winnicott (1968) understands children as 
proceeding from ‘absolute dependence, rapidly changing to relative 
dependence, and always travelling towards (but never reaching) 
independence’ (p. 90). His fine-grained descriptions of the development of 
false self structures in babies responding to their mother’s (or other 
carer’s) sensitivity to their spontaneous gestures is an outstanding 
example of such an approach (Winnicott, 1965). The result of failure to 
separate and differentiate can be adults who ‘are unable to take in that 
the other person does not want what we want, do what we say’ (Benjamin, 
1998, p. 86). 
Beyond Early Object Relations 
As object relations theory gained and lost ground during the second half of 
the 20th century, its take-up beyond clinical practice, notably by feminist 
theory, led to an emphasis on the two-person relationship at the expense 
of other configurations. Beyond this dyadic emphasis, I want to pick out 
three more recent trends that take forward the understanding of self in 
primary relationships: the first involves ways of conceptualizing the 
dynamic relationship between individuality and intersubjectivity; the 
second goes beyond dyadic relations by focusing on triangular space; and 
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the third reintroduces sibling relationships into the dynamics of self 
formation. 
Thomas Ogden (1994/1999) says that in his concept of the ‘analytic 
third’, he is indebted to Winnicott’s famous claim that ‘there is no such 
thing as a baby (apart from maternal provision)’ (p. 462). Typical of many 
conceptual developments in psychoanalysis, his empirical examples are 
derived from his psychoanalytic practice. The ‘analytic third’ captures the 
radical nature of intersubjective dynamics: ‘the dialectical movement of 
subjectivity and intersubjectivity’, an interaction of two people at a psychic 
level. The third is ‘a creation of the first two who are also created by it’ (p. 
462). Fred Alford (2002), likewise inspired by Winnicott, conceptualizes 
the importance of the primary relationship to another in terms of 
transitional space, one of Winnicott’s most creative and influential 
concepts: ‘the maternal is best conceptualized as that transitional space 
Winnicott writes about, neither self nor other, not because they are 
confused, but because no one has to ask’ (p. 133). 
From such developments, I have derived a view of subjectivity as a 
never-ending dynamic tension between individuality and intersubjectivity 
(Hollway, in press). In any encounter, real or in fantasy, this dynamic 
tension is re-engaged. As a result, the subjectivity that emerges is not 
identical to the subjectivity that entered. This description is not confined 
to children’s development, but applies to changes and continuity 
throughout life. 
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My second example of useful theoretical development in object 
relations theory is one that supplements the dyadic emphasis of 
Winnicottian theory. From within object relations psychoanalysis has 
come an emphasis on three-person intersubjectivity. Ron Britton (1998) 
sums up the argument for the importance of triangular relations in self 
development as follows: 
If the link between the parents perceived in love and 
hate can be tolerated in the child’s mind, it provides 
the child with a prototype of an object relationship of 
a third kind in which he or she is witness and not a 
participant. [From this vantage point] we can also 
envisage ourselves being observed … a capacity for 
entertaining another point of view while retaining our 
own. (pp. 41-42) 
This is a very different experience of oneself in social relations to that of  
being in the dyad, where one is a direct participant; one’s self always in 
the front line. The dynamic that Britton calls triangulation has drawn 
psychoanalytic attention back to the role of fathers in child development, 
not in terms of the child-father dyad but rather in this triangle which 
emphasizes the importance of the relation between mother and father (or, 
more generally, two parental figures). This approach has several 
important contributions to make to an improved perspective on policy. For 
example, the stress on absent fathers (Youell, 2002) is refined so that it is 
not simply fathers’ physical absence that may be a problem for children’s 
(particularly boys’) identity but the ‘internal father’ that exists in the 
mother’s mind which is bound to affect the child. Likewise the ‘internal 
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father’ in the child’s mind may be sustaining or not in the absence of the 
actual father (depending on a life history of both real and fantasied 
meanings that have gone to make up this image). The theorization of this 
third figure in children’s development also affords scope for thinking about 
alternative family forms where the other adult carer in the child’s family 
may not be the biological father, or a man. 
Bollas (1993), for example, takes the position that ‘Rather than 
emphasize the person of the mother or the father as objects to be 
internalized, I prefer to speak of them as bearing orders: sets of functions 
which engage and process the infant’ (p. 37). He goes on to differentiate 
between these orders and the people who embody them: 
By placing certain attributes under the name of the 
father (for example interpretation) or mother (for 
example reverie), I am not saying that the father is 
incapable of reverie or that the mother is not [sic] 
without her own form of interpretation. … It is 
important to bear in mind that these orders are not 
descriptions of how all mothers and fathers behave, 
but of processes associated with and usually 
conducted by the mother or the father, who assume 
differing forms of significance for the developing 
infant. (p. 37) 
Critique from within psychoanalysis of the dominant 20th-century 
paradigm does not stop there but furnishes my third example. Recently, 
Juliet Mitchell (2001, 2003) has argued that psychoanalytic theory has 
been blind to the importance of sibling relationships in self development, 
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and that if internalized social relationships are the major elements of the 
psyche (Mitchell, 2003, p. 1), then sibling relationships deserve a central 
place in thinking about subjectivity. She is writing against the 
psychoanalytic perspective in which ‘the Oedipus complex and preOedipal 
mother-infant relationship are presented as the only nexuses that link the 
internal world of unconscious thought processes and affects with the 
external social world’ (p. 190). Evidence for the importance of sibling 
relationships on subjectivity exists; Mitchell excavates some from the 
clinical psychoanalytic literature but it was not considered theoretically 
significant and in psychoanalysis it is usually reinterpreted on to the 
vertical axis of parental relationships, following the orthodox Freudian 
emphasis that is encapsulated in the idea of the Oedipus complex. One 
rather crucial effect of this has been that analysts routinely miss the 
importance of sibling transferences in their own clinical work, as probably 
happened in their own training, so that they reproduce the sibling blind 
spot. This has effects on the body of theory that is continually being 
refined and revised through clinical experience. Mitchell is seeking not to 
displace the importance of mothers and fathers, but rather to modify how 
we understand their influence through including the trauma and 
developmental challenges that are precipitated by having siblings and the 
meaning of this in the context of the child’s relationship with her or his 
mother (fathers get little attention in Mitchell’s account). 
Mitchell’s central argument is that babies and children are 
traumatized when a sibling is born. This trauma (on top of separation 
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from the mother) is profound, a threat of annihilation of identity, because 
who am I when I am no longer the baby? The child’s experience of the 
trauma of sibling displacement means that violence is always latent and 
can be re-enacted in wider sibling-substitute relationships, if not with 
actual siblings. Hate coexists with love. Love derives from the fact that 
‘baby’ is expected to be a replica of oneself and therefore loved 
narcissistically. Sex and violence are expressions of these wishes, when 
acted out. Just as the parent-child relationship is, according to 
psychoanalysis, an unconscious template for the enactment of all vertical 
relationships, so sibling relationships are the template for all lateral 
relationships. 
Each of these three areas provides an example of what I consider to 
lead to improvements in the psychoanalytic theorizing of subjectivity 
through insights into unconscious intersubjective dynamics. 
Conclusions 
This article has raised questions about the relationship of two different 
discursive accounts of the construction of subjectivity to a developmental 
psychoanalytic account of self. How is it possible to reconcile these? The 
first, the dialogic or discursive psychology tradition of theorizing 
subjectivity, has in common with object relations psychoanalysis its 
emphasis on relationality (or what I prefer to call intersubjectivity). 
Drewery’s work (2005, p. 313) exemplifies this view of subjectivity as a 
product of discursive interaction. Specifically, the process involves 
‘position calls’: ‘a position call invites the person being spoken to into a 
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particular subject position, which the respondent may or may not take up’ 
(Drewery, 2005, p. 316).** Like Ogden, Drewery takes the view that such 
everyday encounters change the subjectivities of those involved. Although 
she refers to her approach as a ‘thorough-going constructionism’ (p. 321) 
and she makes no mention of an internal world, nonetheless, within any 
interaction, there is an individuality engaged in dynamic tension: 
‘individuals are both the site and the subject of a discursive struggle for 
identity … formed in relationship with others, mostly (but not entirely) 
through language’ (p. 319). Ogden’s concept of the third (above) enables 
him to see communication (talk and conversation, but also non-verbal 
forms, unconscious communication and reading) as a process of ‘doing 
battle with one’s static self identity through the recognition of a 
subjectivity (a human I-ness) that is other to oneself’ (Ogden, 1994/1999, 
p. 3). Such formulations, while coming from very different traditions, are 
not in conflict with each other, although their use of different ontologies 
results in different emphases. 
The post-structuralist account of the production of subjectivity in 
‘psy’ discourses provided my second example of a discourse analytic, 
constructionist approach. In the light of this critique, the use of object 
relations accounts posed a paradox about the epistemological status of this 
knowledge. While agreeing that, as discourses, these will continue to 
‘infuse and shape the personal investments of individuals’ (Rose 
1990:129), I have espoused a critical realist epistemology to evaluate what 
is a better and worse account of self development in family relationships 
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and on the basis of this been selective in developing ways of viewing 
unconscious intersubjectivity as part of a psycho-social theorization, not 
only of self development but also of adult subjectivity. I have not only 
emphasized the utility and radical potential of object relations approaches, 
but also shown their dynamism and provisionality. This was exemplified 
in recent theoretical developments away from a focus on the child-mother 
dyad. Likewise, my brief psycho-social account does not need to claim 
truth status; it is historically situated and thus provisional. 
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